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Introduction
Reserve requirements have been part of the reg-
ulator)' apparatus of banking in the United States
for more than a century and a half. No matter
what their original purpose may have been,
maintaining the burden of reserve requirements
needs a contemporary rationale that can justify
the problems they create.
The problems attributed to reserve require-
ments are woven into the fabric of financial mar-
kets. The burden of meeting the regulation
appears to vary unfairly among banks of compa-
rable size. Financial institutions not subject to the
regulation engage in many of the same activities
as those required to hold reserves. Legislative
efforts to overhaul the nation's banking and finan-
cial system would be easier if reserve requirements
could be eliminated from the set of issues to be
considered. Financial reform aside, reducing or
eliminating these requirements might be a way to
improve the profitability of banking and the will-
ingness of banks to extend credit while under
pressure to improve capital. Moreover, even if
problem loan and inadequate capital matters were
resolved, many analysts believe that reserve re-
quirements still would impair the international
competitiveness of U.S. banks.
Two obvious approaches to removing the
burden of reserve requirements are to eliminate
them altogether or to pay a market rate of interest
on reserve balances. This article deals only with
the first approach, exploring various rationales
for reserve requirements on the premise that
there would be no point in paying a market rate
of interest on reserves if there were no rationale
for requiring reserves in the first place. Perhaps
because the requirements have been part of the
structure of depository institution markets for so
long, their rationale seems obscure and the effect
of their elimination even more so. Recent elimi-
nation of a portion of reserve requirements has
sharpened the issue.' If a partial elimination was
good, would not complete elimination be better?
After a brief description of the reserve require-
ments now in place, the discussion is organized
around their three traditional rationales: taxation,
• 1 In December 1990, the reserve requirement on nonpersonal time
deposits of less than one and a half years' maturity and on Eurocurrency
liabilities was reduced from 3 percent to zero. In all, the change was esti-
mated to have reduced required reserves by almost $14 billion.TABLE 1
Reserve Requirement Coverage,
Fall 1990
Estimated number of depository institutions 34.200







SOURCE: Hoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
monetary policy, and liquidity.
2 The Federal
Reserve transfers most of its net earnings to the
Treasury, amounting to about $23 billion in 1990.
The portion of the transfer that can be attributed
to the reserve requirement "tax,'' though only a
trivial source of Treasury revenue, has had non-
trivial distorting effects on financial markets.
The second rationale, monetary policy, be-
came the explicit and only statutory justification
for reserve requirements in 1980, although with-
out the requirements, policy could continue to
operate just as it does today. Only if monetary
policy were to operate in a way in which it has
never operated in the past could reserve require-
ments be rationalized as a way to improve the
short-run accuracy of policy implementation.
Finally, and contrary to traditional assertions,
modem reserve requirements serve a short-run
liquidity function by ensuring a pool of balances
for daily private-market distribution to credit-
worthy illiquid institutioas. This liquidity function
can be used as a rationale for reserve require-
ments, however, only if there Is reason to avoid
relying solely upon the alternatives of daily open
market operations and discount window lending
to meet die banking system's liquidity needs.
I. The Facts about
Current Reserve
Requirements
Federal Reserve Regulation D governs reserve re-
quirements, defining assets eligible to be counted
as reserves and liabilities subject to the requirement.
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 made these
requirements applicable to all commercial
banks, mutual savings banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions, agencies and
branches of foreign banks, and Edge Act corpo-
rations operating in the United States.
Reservable liabilities include transactions
deposits (that is, accounts that allow unlimited
nonautomatic third-party payments), nonper-
sonal time deposits, and Eurocurrency liabilities.
However, in December 1990 the required
reserve ratio was set at zero for all but transac-
tions deposits. Eligible assets include vault cash
and reserve deposits held at Federal Reserve
Banks. Box 1 provides a more-detailed descrip-
tion of the current reserve requirement account-
ing system.
More than 34,000 institutions now fall within
the purview of Regulation D (see table 1). How-
ever, over 19,000 small institutions are essential-
ly unaffected because the Gam-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 mandates a
zero reserve ratio for the first $3.4 million of
reservable liabilities of any kind.
3 As a result,
many of these small institutions need only com-
plete an annual request for data, which allows
the Federal Reserve to monitor compliance and
to update estimates of the monetary aggregates.
The remaining 14,900 institutions must com-
ply with reserve requirements on a quarterly or
biweekly basis, submitting quarterly or weekly
accounting records to the Federal Reserve Banks
so that compliance with the regulation can be
monitored on an ongoing basis. In addition,
these same records provide much of the raw data
used in compiling weekly and monthly estimates
of the monetary aggregates, including the mon-
etary base, Ml, M2, and M3. This information is
important both for the Federal Reserve's conduct
of monetary policy and for other users' efforts to
track Fed policy and the economy. Supervisory
authorities monitor reporting accuracy as part of
the normal examination process.
• 2 Goodfriend and Hargraves (1983) present a thorough examina-
tion of the evolution of the liquidity and monetary policy rationales, and
of the revenue aspects of the tax rationale. My assessment of the various
rationales differs from theirs in that I place more emphasis on short-run
liquidity considerations and view the tax rationale from a broader perspec-
tive than revenue. Revenue is both smaller than might be inferred from
their discussion and difficult to defend from avoidance.
• 3 Initially, the Act set the 0 percent reserve requirement at $2 mil-
lion of reservable liabilities for each institution, with a provision for an-
nual adjustment. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(1990), table 1.15, footnote 2.B 0 X 1
The Details of Required
Reserves Accounting
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 stipulates that
only transactions and nonpersonal time deposits are
reservable. and mandates a further distinction on
the basis of an institution's size. Reserve require-
ments are different for nonpersonal time deposits
than for transactions deposits.
. The reserve ratio for nonpersonal time deposits
(including Eurocurrency liabilities) may be set
within the range of 0 to 9 percent and may vary by
the maturity of a deposit." Prior to December 1990,
the regulation specified a ratio of 3 percent for
deposits with an original maturity of less than one
and a half years, and zero for longer maturities; now
the ratio is zero for all maturities.
The required reserve ratio for transactions
deposits depends on the amount of these deposits
on an institution's books: 3 percent of the first S40.4
million (of which up to $3-4 million is exempted)
and 12 percent of the amount in excess of the S40.4
million break point.'
1 The 3 percent ratio and the
break point are determined by law. but the Board of
Governors has statutory authority to set the higher
ratio within a range of 8 percent to 14 percent.
The transactions deposit reserve required for a
weekly reporting institution is computed from the
average level of transactions deposits during a two-
week computation period that ends every other
Monday. Reserve assets eligible to satisfy this re-
quirement are drawn from two sources: 1) the aver-
age amount of vault cash held during the two-week
period ended 28 days prior to the end of the compu-
tation period and 2) the average amount of reserve
deposits held during the two-week maintenance
period ending on the Wednesday two days after the
end of the computation period. This arrangement,
with the reserve computation and the reserve
deposit maintenance periods overlapping on 12 out
of 14 days, is referred to as a "contemporaneous
reserve requirement."
The operation of transactions deposit reserve re-
quirements may be more readily understock from
the vantage point of a weekly reporting institution
managing its reserve position. The institution enters a
two-week reserve maintenance period'knowing the
amount of vault cash eligible to meet its requirement.
After the second day of the computation period, the
institution can begin to maintain reserve deposit
balances agaiast its accumulating transactions
deposit requirement. After the second Tuesday of the
maintenance period, the institution knows the full
amount of reserves it must hold to meet the transac-
tioas deposit requirement, as well as the amount of
reserve deposits it has held over the first 12 days of
the maintenance period. The institution then has the
opportunity' to adjust its reserve deposit balance on
the remaining two days of the period to make re-
serves held equal to the requirement (plus or minus
any eligible carry-in and any desired carry-out).
Quarterly reporting institutions operate on a
lagged reserve accounting basis. Computation is
based on deposits held during a single seven-day
period beginning the third Tuesday of March, June,
September, and December of each year. Vault cash
held during that saniS seven-day period is deducted
from required reserves. Any remainder becomes the
required reserve deposit balance to be held on a
daily average basis throughout 13 weekly mainte-
nance periods beginning the fourth Thursday follow-
ing the end of the computation period and ending
the day before the next set of 13 maintenance
periods begins.
a. Eurcx:iirn:nf\
- liabilities are a measure of the net foreign funding of U.S. creditors through international facilities of U.S. institutions
and through L'.S. facilities of foreign institutions.
b. The break, originally S25 million, must be adjusted no later than December 31 of each year by 80 percent of the percentage increase
or decrease in total transactions accounts of all depository institutions in the calendar year ending the previous June 30.
NOTE: A more complete description of reserve accounting can be found in Meulendyke (1989), pp. 12
7-36.^^H TABLE 2
Composition of Vault Cash
and Deposits at Federal Reserve
Banks, All Depository
Institutions, May 1991

















NOTE: Data are monthly averages of biweekly maintenance period
averages. Vault cash includes only the amount held by those depository
institutions subject to reserve requirements. The maintenance period in
which vault cash can be used to satisfy reserve requirements ends 30 days
after the close of a biweekly computation period during which the vault
cash was actually held.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Accurate record-keeping is important to each
institution, and not just to avoid supervisory dif-
ficulties. Missing the required reserve target can
be costly: Reserve deficiencies are penalized at a
rate two percentage points above the discount
rate, while excess reserves do not earn interest.
Some leeway is provided through a carryover
provision, however. This allows a weekly report-
ing institution to carry over (for one period only)
a deficiency of up to 2 percent of its required.
reserves by holding an equivalent amount of
excess reserves in the next reserve maintenance
period, or to use excess reserves of up to 2 per-
cent in meeting its reserve requirement in the
next period."
1
• 4 The 2 percent carryover provision gives a bank considerable lee-
way in the deposit balance It must maintain at the Fed on any single day
ot a 14-day maintenance period. A bank entering a period with no carry-
over, meeting 55 percent of its required reserve with vault cash (the
recent aggregate average), and holding the required amount of deposits
on a dally average basis for 13 days of the period could allow its deposit
balance on the fourteenth day to deviate from the daily average required
amount by as much as 62 percent (= f [ .02 x 14 ] / [ 1 - .55 ] I x 100)
and still not waste excess reserves or be penalized for a reserve deficiency.
However, any bank that meets more than 72 percent of its required reserve
with vault cash would be unable to take full advantage of this leeway to
cover a single-day reserve deficiency because to do so would mean hold-
ing a negative balance on that day.
Required reserves are far larger than deposi-
tory institutions' holdings of reserve deposits at
Federal Reserve Banks for several reasons. First,
more than half of aggregate reserve require-
ments in a typical maintenance period are satis-
fied by vault cash holdings (see table 2). In fact,
many institutions meet more than 100 percent
of their requirement in this way. Less than 90
percent of eligible vault cash is actually applied
toward meeting requirements; the remainder is
surplus vault cash (not included in measured ex-
cess reserves) held by institutions whose portfo-
lios are not bound by reserve requirements.
These "unbound" institutions, including some
of the largest weekly reporters, voluntarily hold
cash inventories for their teller stations and auto-
mated teller machines that more than satisfy
their reserve requirements.
Second, about 15 percent of depository insti-
tutions' aggregate deposit balances at Federal
Reserve Banks are not in reserve deposit ac-
counts but in clearing accounts that yield earn-
ings credits used to offset charges for Reserve
Bank services. Maintaining a clearing account
provides direct access to these services for insti-
tutions that do not need reserve accounts, or
supplements a required balance in order to
reduce the likelihood of daylight or overnight
overdraft problems. An institution arrives at the
appropriate level of its clearing balance, in con-
sultation with its Reserve Bank, on the basis of
size and the volume and intraday pattern of its
transactions. Once determined, the agreed-upon
balance must be maintained on an average
daily basis during a reserve maintenance period
in the same way as for required reserves.^
Finally, about 4 percent of depository institu-
tioas' aggregate deposit balances at Federal
Reserve Banks are simply excess reserves. Aggre-
gate excess reserves tend to fluctuate around a
relatively stable level that Is related not to the
level of interest rates, but to the distribution of
excess reserves among different kinds of institu-
tions in response to calendar-related regularities
in payment flows and balance-sheet "window
dressing." In effect, the typical excess reserve
level is simply the combined "small change" in
the accounts of many institutions.
6 On the last
day of a maintenance period, each holder of
• 5 Earnings credits are calculated from the average federal funds rate
for the maintenance period during which balances are held. Clearing bal-
ances are subject to the same 2 percent carryover provisions as required
. reserves. However, earnings credits on clearing balances that are not used
to offset service charges during the maintenance period can be carried for-
ward up to 52 weeks.
• 6 For a recent explanation of the determinants of excess reserves,
see Partian, Hamdani, and Camilli (1986).excess reserves apparently is either unsure of its
exact position, or finds that the federal funds
rate is insufficient to offset the cost of placing its





In a sease, banks are taxed when they are re-
quired to hold more non-interest-bearing eligible
assets than they would maintain in the absence
of reserve requirements. As already noted, not
all banks are in this situation: Some voluntarily
hold more reserve assets than required and thus
are not bound by the requirements. Moreover,
even for bound institutions, not all reserve assets
represent involuntary holdings, because banks
would undoubtedly hold inventories of vault
cash even in the absence of reserve require-
ments. Apart from these observed and unob-
served voluntary holdings, however, reserve
requirements must tax some combination of
bank owners, depositors, and borrowers.
One could argue that the level of many banks"
reserve deposits is not substantially different
from that needed for clearing purposes and that
reserve deposits are therefore not a tax, even
though overnight holdings of Fed deposits do
not earn interest. It is more likely, however, that
in the absence of binding reserve requirements
and with the interest-rate levels typical of the last
40 years, banks would find it cheaper to alter the
mechanisms of clearing and settlement than to
continue to bear the opportunity cost of holding
non-interest-bearing overnight Fed deposits.
The repercussions of the tax depend on its in-
cidence, determined by elasticities both of the
supply of reservable deposits and of the demand
for loans and other services (hereafter referred to
simply as "loans"). At one extreme, if financial
markets provided perfect substitutes for banks"
reservable deposits and loans (perfectly elastic
supply and demand, respectively), the tax could
not be passed on to customers, and the incidence
• 7 Every institution always has an incentive to minimize its excess
reserves, because excess reserves earn no interest. The carryover provision
of the reserve accounting regulation provides one avenue tor an interest-
rate influence. For example, if an institution foresees higher interest rates in
the immediate tuture, it might try to use excess reserves to prefinance the .
allowable portion ot its next-period reserve requirement. Alternatively, it
might hold excess reserves to offset a deliberate reserve deficiency in the
previous maintenance period that was induced by expectations ot an
interest-rate decline. Such deliberate manipulation cannot exert a continu-
ous influence on a single institution's reserves because neither excesses
nor deficiencies can be carried over tor more than one maintenance period.
of the tax would be on the profitability of bank-
ing. This would be reflected in the numlx^r and
value of bank charters. At the other extreme, if
banks were sufficiently unique to ensure that
financial markets provided no substitutes for
reservable deposits or bank loans (perfectly in-
elastic supply and demand), the whole tax could
be passed along to bank customers, and the in-
cidence of the tax would be on them. Phrasing
the matter slightly differently, the more elastic
the supply of reservable deposits and the
demand for bank loans, the more the tax will
distort financial flows by diverting bank business
to other financial instruments or markets.*
Distortions in the
Allocation of Funds
Postwar history provides a wealth of financial
developments that can be attributed, at least in
part, to the distorting effects of reserve require-
ments.
9 The Monetary Control Act of 1980 may-
be viewed as one response to several of these
distortions. Until the Act was passed. Regulation
D applied only to commercial banks that were
members of the Federal Reserve System. Mem-
bership was mandatory for national banks but
voluntary for state-chartered banks. The burden
of meeting reserve requirements was one of the
factors thought to have contributed to steady
erosion in membership of state banks and in
chartering of national banks.
1
0 The Act ex-
tended coverage of reserve requirements to all
commercial banks, members and nonmembers
alike, in effect reducing elasticities of the supply
of reservable deposits and of the demand for
bank loans at member banks.
The Monetary Control Act also extended
coverage of reserve requirements to thrift institu-
tions. Until 1980, thrifts were subject to less
burdensome reserve requirements imposed by
• 8 Recent discussions of a "credit crunch" sometimes reflect differ-
ing views about these elasticities. Those arguing that a crunch should not
concern policymakers may assume that the elasticities are large enough
to ensure that most borrowers not serviced by banks will be accommo-
dated elsewhere. Those recommending that a crunch be offset through
monetary policy and supervisory actions may assume that the elasticities
are small enough to ensure that many borrowers not serviced by banks
will not be serviced at all.
• 9 The first (unsuccessful) attempt to legislate federal reserve re-
quirements in the United States was motivated by a desire to "distort" the
state-chartered "Pet Banks" out ol existence and thereby to defeat Andrew
Jackson's repudiation of the Second Bank ot the United States.(Stevens
(forthcoming]).
• 10 A representative statement of this position can be found in
Volcker(1980).TABLE 3
Allocation of Funds: Secular
Growth of Debt Instruments and
Lending Sectors, 1952-1990
Debt Instruments
Credit market debt owed by
nonfinancial borrowers in the form of:







Total domestic debt instruments
Foreign debt instruments
Domestic plus foreign debt instruments
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Credit market debt claims against
nonfinancial sectors held by:
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SOl'RCK: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Svstem.
individual states and Federal Home Loan Banks.
New England thrifts pioneered in the develop-
ment of interest-bearing transactions accounts,
which were free of member-bank reserve re-
quirements. Member commercial banks, in com-
petition, also devised variations of savings
accounts to take advantage both of the lower
reserve requirements on savings than on trans-
actions deposits and of the ability to pay interest
on savings accounts."
Of course, reserve requirements were not the
only force at work in shifting deposits from
member banks to nonmember banks and thrift
institutions, and from transactions accounts to
variants of savings accounts. High nominal inter-
est rates in an inflationary environment certainly
stimulated efforts to avoid both the prohibition
of interest on demand deposits and the oppor-
tunity cost of holding non-interest-bearing
required reserves. The increasing power and
declining cost of telecommunications technol-
ogy made it economically feasible to sweep
balances back and forth between accounts and
institutions in order to minimize reservable bal-
ances and to pay interest. But member banks'
desire to avoid reserve requirements on par-
ticular kinds of deposits was clearly an impor-
tant factor in the evolving distribution of funds
among types of accounts and types of deposi-
tory institutions, as well as between deposits
and safe, liquid securities.
Furthermore, the distorting effect of reserve
requirements has not been restricted to the
deposit side of intermediaries' balance sheets.
In the 1960s, sales of loans to a banks affiliates,
with affiliate financing from nondeposit sources
such as commercial paper, assumed substantial
scale. One clear advantage of this arrangement
was that it enabled a banking organization to
avoid the reserve requirement, until the require-
ment was extended to this source of funding in
1970. The same was true of loans booked at
foreign affiliates and funded by offshore dollar
deposits, until reserve requirements were ex-
panded to cover this distortion also.
1"
Today, an analogous pattern of financing
carried out by unaffiliated foreign banks is cited
as evidence that reserve requirements place
domestic banks at a disadvantage in competing
with foreign banks. Similarly, growth of the
commercial paper market and of direct lending
by life insurance companies and pension funds,
all relative to slower secular growth of bank
lending, is cited as evidence of reserve require-
ments' possible distorting effect on the pattern
of financial intermediation and credit flows in
the economy.
Some suggestion of distortion can be seen in
data from the Flow of Funds Accounts, available
on a consistent basis since 1952 (table 3). This
information can only describe what has been.
not what would have been in the absence of
reserve requirements. The trend of bank loan
• 11 Distortions of this kind were not unique to the postwar period.
The low 3 percent reserve requirement against time and savings deposits
after 1917 led to cases"... where, to meet the competition of State savings
banks, some member banks... devised a special savings account on which
checks [could] be drawn without the presence ot the depositor at the bank.
These accounts [were] evidenced by savings passbooks in which the bank
reserveldl the right to require 30 days' notice before making payment on a
withdrawal. When the account (was] opened, a duplicate passbook (was)
left with the bank, which enter[ed] therein the amount of each withdrawal at
the time checks on these accounts [were) presented for payment." See
Committee on Bank Reserves ol the Federal Reserve System (1931). p. 15.
I 12 These provisions are discussed in Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (1971), p. 19.FIGURE 1
Reserve Requirement
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NOTE: For further explanation of the estimates plotted here, see appendix.
SOl'RCKS: l".S. Treasury Department: Office of Management and Budget:
and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
growth has been lower than the growth trends
of mortgages, tax-exempt securities, commercial
paper, and other miscellaneous instruments;
only the lower growth trend of government and
agency securities allowed bank loan growth to
lie slightly higher than for all debt instruments
combined. Commercial bank holdings of claims
on all nonfinancial borrowers — a rough meas-
ure of the size of the banking system from the
asset side of the balance sheet — have grown ..
somewhat more slowly than the holdings of any
other intermediary group. More striking is evi-
dence of successful efforts to minimize the
reserve requirement tax: The combined reserve
deposits and vault cash assets of commercial
banks have grown at only about one-third the
rates of growth of bank loans and. indeed, of
the banking system, largely because the growth
rate of reserve deposits has averaged only 1.3
percent since 1952.
The Nature of the Tax
A pure revenue, "seigniorage" rationale for the
reserve requirement tax seems weak. Congress
has not shown a strong interest in using reserve
requirements as a deliberate means of raising
revenue. As noted in the preceding section, ero-
sion of the tax base, reflecting the competitive
ingenuity that is characteristic of private markets,
was repaired by the Monetary Control Act of
1980. However, because this repair was accom-
panied by reduced tax rates (required reserve
ratios), revenues attributable to reserve require-
ments have not kept pace with other Treasury
revenues. As a percentage of Treasury revenue,
the tax has never yielded as much as 1 percent
and has fallen by more than half since 1974.
averaging slightly less than four-tenths of 1 per-
cent in the 1980s (figure 1).
1
?
Calling reserve requirements a tax may be
something of a misnomer because,their ration-
ale may not be revenue, but an implicit license,
or user. fee. Just as trucks pay taxes to use the
nation's highways, so too may banks (more
properly, depository institutions since 1980) pay
a reserve requirement tax to use unique govern-
ment services. These include the Federal Reserve
services of settlement, same-day irrevocable wire
transfer of balances (allowing direct access to




Meeting reserve requirements, however, has
not been closely related to use of the nation's
central bank services. Nonpersonal time deposit
liabilities were one basis for setting the user fee
prior to December 1990, but those financial in-
struments are little different from some of the in-
struments used in financing nonbanks. which are
not subject to the fee. In this sense, institutions
subject to the user fee obtained nothing that was
not available to institutions not subject to the fee.
Since December 1990. the relationship has been
closer. A depository institution's corporate char-
ter includes the right to issue transactions depos-
its: money market mutual funds and credit card
services offer closely competing products that
limit banks' ability to transfer the tax to holders
of transactions deposits. With the ability to issue
taxed deposits come associated rights to Federal
Reserve services, although there is no necessary-
connection between the amount of central bank
services a bank uses and its tax payment.
• 13 These same tax estimates have been in an 8.5 percent to 10.5
percent range of after-tax bank profits since 1982 (using actual losses
and recoveries rather than provisions tor loan losses as the relevant ex-
pense item in calculating profit).
• 14 This view is made explicit in the suggestion that reserve re-
quirements be based not on the level of deposits, but on activity in de-
posit accounts (Jacoby [1963]). Mayer (1966) presents a different
argument: Reserve requirements are an excise tax on theimplicit return
to holders of non-interest-bearing deposits. He suggests that the tax is
a "second-best" way to avoid distorting resource allocation in a world
replete with sales and excise taxes on the explicit prices of other items.
This assumes, however, that the incidence of the tax is on depositors,
which need not be the case if good substitutes are available.fl
If reserve requirements are indeed an im-
plicit user fee, they are for access only. With few
exceptions, explicit fees for Reserve Bank pay-
ment services cover the full cost of their provi-
sion. Stripping away these services, if the reserve
requirement tax is to be considered a user fee, it
must be a fee paid for the right to use a Federal
Reserve deposit account to settle transactions
and for access to the discount window as the
lender of last resort.
The tax rationale for reserve requirements is
weak. While the requirements have some of the
characteristics of a tax. they are neither a de-
pendable and important source of revenue nor
a user fee that relates the quantity of services





Monetary policy has the unique function of con-
trolling the supply of "outside money." In the
United States, it is the Federal Reserve that
decides how much outside money to make
available to the private sector, in the form of cur-
rency held by the nonbank public and banks'
holdings of vault cash and deposit balances at
Reserve Banks. These assets are created, for the
most part, by Federal Reserve open market pur-
chases of U.S. government securities and by dis-
count window lending.
Binding reserve requirements introduce an
artificial demand for outside money on the part
of banks. Two questions arise in looking for a .
monetary policy rationale for requirements.
1"
1
One is whether they are necessary for monetary
control to function, and the other (irrespective of
necessity) is whether they improve monetary con-
trol by reducing deviations from policy objectives.
absence, there is a demand for the outside
money the central bank supplies. With outside
money demanded for its own sake, control of
its supply provides the "anchor" to money,
credit, and prices that defines the role of mone-
tary' policy in the economy. For the foreseeable
future, the public can be expected to demand
currency' and the banks to demand vault cash.
Managing the supply of one or the other, or the
combination of the two assets, should ensure
that monetary control can function.
1
0
A more mundane question concerns tradi-
tional monetary policy operating procedures
used in guiding open market operations and dis-
count window lending. Might reserve require-
ments be necessary because it would be
impossible to carry on monetary policy in these
familiar forms if vault cash were banks' sole out-
side money asset?
Here again the answer is no. Controlling the
supply of currency assets need not operate any
differently than monetary policy operates today.
Banks' demand for outside money would con-
sist exclusively of their demand for vault cash,
and banks' Fed deposit accounts would retain
their utility for making and receiving payments,
including the payments involved in open mar-
ket operations. The only difference would be
that the daily target balance of each bank at the
close of business would be zero, rather than
today's positive amount related to a required
reserve. No bank would voluntarily hold depos-
its that do not pay interest when it could earn
interest simply by selling the funds for immedi-
ate delivery in the overnight market (unless the
overnight rate were zero).
1
The trillion dollars or so of private dollar pay-
ments settled directly or indirectly on the books
of the Federal Reserve Banks each day provide





Reserve requirements are not necessary for mon-
etary' control to function as long as, in their
• 15 The title and language of the Monetary Control Act of 1980 make
clear that reserve requirements were rationalized as a monetary policy device
at that time. Depository institutions were instructed to maintain reserves
"... as the Board may prescribe by regulation solely for the purpose of imple-
menting monetary policy." See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1988).
• 16 A classic discussion of this point may be found in Fama
(1980). Sargent and Wallace (1985) examine a related question:
whether and how the price level is determined if the monetary base bears
a market rate of interest. Fama's discussion is the relevant one here,
where currency, including vault cash, does not carry explicit interest
and where monetary policy does not seem likely to target or to achieve
the deflation rate required to approximate a real, market rate of interest
on currency. See also the discussion of clearing balances in section IV.
• 17 This is the extreme case. It abstracts from any clearing balances
banks might want to maintain with the Fed in return tor earnings credits
used to offset charges for priced services. Only about $3.2 billion of clear-
ing balances were held in July 1991, which would earn about $180 mil-
lion at a 5.75 percent funds rate, or roughly 20 percent of 1990 total fees
for priced services. It also ignores the possibility of requiring clearing
balances with no (or wasted) earnings credits to reduce Reserve Bank risk
exposure through daylight and overnight overdrafts.bearing deposit balances overnight.
1
8 By defini-
tion, all of these payments net to zero. Of
course, on any particular day some banks will
find themselves in a net credit position, receiv-
ing more payments than they make, while
others will find themselves in an equal and off-
setting net debit position. Banks with net credits
(or their customers) can lend the needed funds
to banks with net debits, with same-day delivery.
Payments do not net to zero for transactions
between the private sector and the Fed, the
Treasury, or any other institution able to operate
outside the private banking system because it
holds accounts directly with a Federal Reserve
Bank. However, as long as there is no monetary
policy reason to change the supply of outside
money, the Federal Reserve can be expected to
engage in defensive open market operations to
offset the net debit or credit created by payments
between the private banking system and these
other institutions. Inevitable errors in forecasting
reserve availability, however, will produce days
of oversupply, when banks are left holding
some unwanted reserve deposits, or of under-
supply, when banks are forced to borrow from
the discount window to avoid overdrafts.
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Errors in reserve supply should be more
noticeable when the target is a zero aggregate
stock of reserves rather than a positive stock.
The federal funds rate and discount window
borrowing would be more volatile, both during
a day and day to day. unless the operating pro-
cedure for implementing policy were made
more continuously rate sensitive, or market
forces developed new ways to smooth the rate.
Today, the need for reserve deposits to satisfy
reserve requirements provides a market basis
for arbitrage that smooths the funds rate in the
face of supply errors. If reserves are short in the
aggregate and the rate starts to rise relative to the
expected level, banks can lend by postponing
• 18 Banks could still initiate payments at the opening of business,
even with zero overnight balances, as long as Reserve Banks continued to
permit daylight overdrafts. If daylight overdrafts were prevented, zero over-
night balances would preclude banks from initiating same-day payments
from their Reserve Bank accounts at the opening of business. However,
even in this case, banks would likely find it cheaper to alter the mechanisms
of clearing and settlement than to bear the opportunity cost of non-interest-
bearing overnight balances. All payments could be processed on private
clearing networks, with simultaneous net settlements at a common hour, or
with settlement in some medium other than Reserve Bank accounts. For a
discussion of the trade-offs among overnight Reserve Bank balances, day-
light overdrafts, and private payments innovations, see Stevens (1991); for
a discussion of alternative settlement media, see Stevens (1978).
I 19 Occasional estimates of reserve supply errors can be found (Meek
and Levin [19811; Dewald and Gibson (1967]). However, these are for aver-
age levels over a maintenance period, not for the single days relevant to
defensive open market operations in the absence of reserve requirements.
the accumulation of required reserve deposits;
conversely, they can accelerate the accumulation
if reserves are oversupplied and the rate starts to
fall. The rate tends to spike or to plunge only at
the end of a day, when most potential counter-
parties have closed, and on settlement day (the
last day of a maintenance period), when carryover
provides the only leeway for banks to postpone
or to accelerate reserve accumulation.
Every day would be a settlement day if there
were no reserve requirements and therefore lim-
ited possibilities for arbitrage. Every bank would
want zero Fed deposits every night, An aggre-
gate oversupply would lead borrowers away
from the discount window and, if that were not
sufficient to correct the oversupply, would drive
the rate immediately to zero. An aggregate
undersupply would drive the rate high enough
to lead banks to the discount window to avoid
overdrafts. It is unlikely that new market mecha-
nisms would develop to smooth the rate, given
current institutional arrangements. (This issue is
discussed more fully in section IV.)
Policy actions (nondefensive open market
operations) would have the same immediate
effect as errors in reserve supply and might be
more difficult for the public to identify in the
context of wider daily volatility of the funds rate
and of borrowing. Persistence of the visible
effects of easing or restraining reserves would
eventually distinguish a policy move from the
transitory effect of one or more defensive errors.
Another likely difference is that, as policy re-
straint intensified or relaxed, banks would seek
new ways to influence the public's holdings of
currency. This would allow banks to escape
complete reliance on the discount window in
avoiding overdrafts and wasted non-interest-





The essence of monetary control lies in supplying
the amount of outside money most likely to
achieve the policy objective. Although reserve re-
quirements are unnecessary, they might improve
monetary control by ensuring a more predictable
relationship between a policy objective and the
policy instrument used in seeking that objective.
Investigating two dominant approaches to policy
implementation suggests that even though this
rationale cannot be ruled out altogether, it
is weak.One approach to defining the objective/
instrument relationship in monetary policy
would rely on reserve targeting based on the
multiplier concept.
2*? Reserve requirements can
improve monetary control by making the re-
serves multiplier more predictable. This can be
illustrated within a simple monetarist policy
framework. Suppose that 1) the ultimate policy
objective is a stable price level. 2) the most reli-
able route to this objective is to maintain steady
growth of an intermediate target for the transac-
tions deposits supplied by banks, and 3) those
deposits tend to be a multiple of vault cash,
where the predicted multiple is subject to a nor-
mally distributed error. Without a reserve
requirement, banks will hold no Fed deposits,
and assuming no reserve supply errors, devia-
tions from the predicted multiplier will reflect
variations in banks' demand for vault cash rela-
tive to their deposit liabilities.
Imposing a binding reserve requirement
under these circumstances will create an artifi-
cial demand for reserve deposits and will con-
strain variations in the multiplier. Variations in
demand for vault cash relative to deposit liabil-
ities will not affect the demand for reserve
assets relative to deposit liabilities, which
remains a constant, required fraction of bank
deposits. All else equal, reserve requirements
might improve monetary control by reducing
deviations of money from the policy target guid-
ing the supply of reserve assets.
Two matters diminish the persuasiveness of
this rationale. One is that, in the absence of re-
serve requirements, the "noise" introduced into
the multiplier by variations in the demand for
vault cash is likely to be short run around a stable
trend value. Introducing a reserve requirement
might produce a multiplier that is more predict-
able in the short term, but at the cost of introduc-
ing longer-run changes in the trend value as
banks and their competitors devise substitutes
for reservable deposits to avoid the reserve re-
quirement tax.
The other matter is that the Federal Reserve
has never used a consistent multiplier proce-
dure.
2
1 Unless the System were expected to
adopt such an approach in the future, improving
• 20 A full treatment of the multiplier approach to policy control of
the monetary aggregates can be found in Rasche and Johannes (1987).
• 21 See Goodfriend and Hargraves (1983). Perhaps the closest
approximation to the multiplier model was the procedure for controlling
M1 used from October 1979 through late 1982. Reserve paths guided
open market operations, but the paths were adjusted at and between Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings to reflect independent
judgments about the appropriate federal funds-rate level.
monetary control by increasing the short-run
predictability of a reserves multiplier would rep-




Interest-rate targeting is the alternative ap-
proach to monetary policy implementation. As
long as the intended interest rate is not set in a
vacuum but in the context of a reliable feedback
mechanism for controlling a monetary aggregate,
nominal GNP, or the price level, the procedure
amounts to an indirect method of reserve target-
ing. The target amount of reserves is the quantity
that must actually be supplied in prder to main-
tain the intended interest-rate level for a short
period within the feedback process.
Interest-rate targeting in the absence of
reserve requirements should not involve the
same short-run noise associated with the reserves
multiplier approach. Open market operations
that seek to stabilize a money market interest
rate would tend to accommodate unpredictable




In sum, improving monetary control provides
scant rationale for reserve requirements. Only if
the Federal Reserve were to adopt a reserves tar-
geting approach to policy implementation, con-
trary to long-standing practice, could reserve
requirements be expected to make the effects of





A third rationale sometimes suggested for re-
serve requirements is that they serve as a regula-
tory measure to ensure that banks, individually
or in the aggregate, will be able to meet demands
• 22 Increased predictability was a major goal of the wholesale reform
of reserve requirements recommended by members of the Committee on
Bank Reserves of the Federal Reserve System in 1931. With hindsight, their
rationale was no more relevant then—after the late-1920s explosion of
debits/deposit accounts (to which they pointed) and in the midst of the
1929-1933 collapse of the banking system (to which they appeared oblivi-
ous)—than now. The Committee apparently had no conception of using
defensive open market operations to offset variations in a multiplier. Unfor-
tunately, theirs was the prevailing view within the System after the death of
Benjamin Strong in 1928 (see Friedman and Schwartz [1963], especially pp.
407-19). Instead, they recommended legislation (never enacted) to make the
required reserve ratio vary with the debits/deposits multiplier.
• 23 Both reserves and interest-rate targeting are susceptible to-the
daily implementation errors discussed earlier. Inaccurate estimates of
market factors affecting the stock of reserves will produce quantity errors;
inaccurate estimates of the needed size or market interpretation of open
market operations will produce interest-rate errors.for payment without delay. Regulators have twin
concerns of ensuring banks' solvency (capital
adequacy) and banks" liquidity (cash adequacy).
Hie concept of requiring banks to maintain at
least a minimum capital/asset ratio to ensure sol-
vency remains in the bedrock of bank supervi-
sion: the concept of requiring banks to maintain
at least a minimum cash/deposit ratio to ensure
liquidity, on the other hand, has long been dis-




Reserve requirements cannot provide a mean-
ingful source of liquidity for an individual bank
or for the banking system as long as the require-
ment is enforced continuously. After all, if a
bank were required to keep a 10 percent reserve
every day. then it would have only 10 cents avail-
able to meet each dollar of deposit withdrawn. A
reserve regulation that is continuously enforced
can guarantee adequate liquidity only with a 100
percent requirement.
Reserve requirements can provide a meaning-
ful source of liquidity as long as they are not en-
forced continuously. The entire pool of required
balances can be used to cover an immediate cash
drain and can then be replenished either from
asset sales or borrowing or from a return flow of
deposits, as time allows. Early proponents of a
reserve requirement recognized the inadequacy'
of continuous enforcement. Their intention was
not to prevent a bank from using all of its cash as
a source of liquidity when necessary, but to have
each bank husband cash in normal times.
Reserve requirements under the National
Bank Act (1863). for example, were not en-
forced daily. A bank whose reserve fell below
the requirement was prohibited both from ex-
panding its liabilities through new lending and
from paying dividends. When aware of defi-
cient reserves, the Comptroller of the Currency
was empowered, but not required, to give a
bank 30 days" notice to come into compliance.
Failing compliance, the Comptroller was then
authorized, but not required, to close the bank.
J^
The same prohibition on new lending and
dividend payments appeared in the original Fed-
eral Reserve Act. More stringent enforcement
developed after 1913. so that by 1935. member
banks had little scope to use required reserve
deposits even as a short-ain source of liquidity.
They were expected to maintain required
reserve deposits (vault cash was not eligible) for
semiweekly. weekly, or semimonthly averaging
periods, depending on the bank's size and loca-
tion (see Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System [1935], p. 837). Deficiencies
were penalized at a rate 2 percent above the dis-
count rate, and while same-day wire service
was available for transfers of reserve deposits,
daylight overdrafts were not permitted.
After 1935, the scope for relying on required
reserves as a short-run source of liquidity grad-
ually increased. In the mid-1950s, averaging had
broadened to one- or two-week periods, and the
practice of allowing a 2 percent carryover was in
place (see American Bankers Association [1957],
p. 9). Since 1984, averaging has been permitted
within two-week periods for all banks. This en-
forcement mechanism still prevents banks from
relying on required reserves as a source of liquid-
ity for longer than a portion of a reserve mainte-
nance period or, with carryover, for two adjacent
periods. Sustained needs for liquidity require
secondary reserves and access to the money and
interbank-loan markets or. if all else fails, to the
discount window. However, within a reserve
maintenance period, reserve requirements can
enhance banks' liquidity by guaranteeing a pool
of deposits from which to fund imbalances, such
as those arising from clearing and settlement of
checks and electronic payments.
Reserve requirements do not provide this
source of liquidity for banks that use only vault
cash to cover their entire required reserve posi-
tion. For institutions in or near this unbound
condition, the daily target for a reserve deposit
account must be zero; averaging from day to
day is not feasible because overnight overdrafts
of Fed deposit accounts are penalized.
2
6 This is
• 24 As long ago as 1931, the Committee on Bank Reserves of the
Federal Reserve System (1931, p. 5) took the position that it was no longer
the primary function of legal reserve requirements to ensure or to preserve
the liquidity of individual member banks. In 1957. the Economic Policy
Commission of the American Bankers Association (1957. p. 14) concluded
that "...those who cling to the old liquidity approach to reserve require- •
ments will therefore be in disagreement with many of the Commission's
conclusions. They are also likely to find themselves in disagreement
among themselves, because the liquidity approach is not only basically
illogical, but inevitably leads into a maze of complicated side issues on
which no clear-cut answers are possible."
• 25 Rodkey (1934) provides a detailed discussion of reserve re-
quirements under the National Bank Act.
• 26 Overnight overdrafts are costly in that, in addition to the cost of fi-
nancing a "makeup" balance on a subsequent day, the overdraft is penal-
ized at a rate 2 percent above the effective federal funds rate on the day the
overdraft occurred. The ability to run significant daylight overdrafts in Fed-
eral Reserve deposit accounts allows banks to cover payments during a day
without the need for positive reserve deposit balances at the beginning and
end of the day. For a discussion of daylight overdrafts, see Stevens (1991).one reason why banks enter into clearing bal-
ance agreements with their Reserve Banks. By
targeting a positive clearing balance, they
reduce the chances that unexpected events,
especially those late in the day, will result in
costly overnight overdrafts or wasted earnings
opportunities. Clearing accounts make sense only
for institutioas that can use the earnings credits
from clearing balances. Others may prefer to
operate through a correspondent bank rather
than through targeting a zero balance in their
reserve deposit accounts.
Banks that do use reserve deposits to meet
reserve requirements gain liquidity within the im-
mediate confines of a reserve averaging period.
Unexpected outflows on a given day can be
funded by drawing the reserve deposit balance
down as low as zero, as long as this action is off-
set by holding a large enough balance on future
days to maintain the required average balance
during a reserve maintenance period. Similarly,
unexpected inflows of funds on a particular day
do not represent a wasted earnings opportunity
if offset by a smaller balance on future days.
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The lengthening of reserve averaging periods
over the past 50 years has increased the oppor-
tunity for banks to use reserve deposits for short-
run liquidity management. However, the ex-
panded opportunity has not been fully realized
for three reasons. First, as noted earlier, required
reserves have grown only one-third as rapidly as
the banking system (table 3). Second, reserve
deposits have declined from 100 percent to 45
percent of required reserves since 1959, when
banks were first permitted to satisfy reserve re-
quirements with vault cash. Third, the value of
transactions and, presumably, the potential need
for liquidity to cover unexpected imbalances be-
tween inflows and outflows of funds have grown
far more rapidly than reserve deposits. For exam-
ple, while banks' reserve deposit balances grew,
at a 1.3 percent annual rate between 1952 and
1990, the dollar value of payments made from
banks" Federal Reserve accounts grew at a 20
percent annual rate.
Development of active same-day reserve
account management techniques has supple-
mented reserve deposit balances in the handling
of day-to-day liquidity needs for many banks.
• 27 Some examples may be useful: A bank required to hold an
average balance of $100 million can let the balance drop to zero on the
first day and then hold $107.7 million on the remaining 13 days. Or,
having held $100 million on average over the first seven days, it can let
the balance drop to zero on the eighth day and then hold $116.7 million
on the remaining six days. Even on the last day, taking carryover into con-
sideration, a bank that has held $100 million on average over the first 13
days and has met 55 percent of its requirement with vault cash could let
its balance drop to $38 million on the last day (see footnote 4).
Sophisticated computerized systems track move-
ments in reserve deposit accounts during the
course of a day; as needs become apparent,
same-day transactions are used to fund poten-
tial deficits or to lay off surpluses in the money
and interbank markets. The extent to which
modern reserve requirements have a short-run
liquidity rationale depends on the size of the
pool of reserve deposits (for an individual bank
and in the aggregate) relative to potential liquid-
ity needs, which are heavily influenced by the




Before the Federal Reserve System was estab-
lished in 1913, the hallmark of adequate liquid-
ity in the banking system was an increase in the
ratio of currency to bank deposits without a
suspension of specie payments, whether in
response to a seasonal increase in currency de-
mand or an incipient banking panic. Typically,
this was made possible by running down the
cash reserves of banks in Reserve cities, as other
banks drew on them. Augmenting the aggregate
stock of cash by tapping Treasury and foreign
holdings of specie tended to be inadequate.
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Since 1913, however, Reserve Banks have
been able to augment the aggregate stock of
cash in response to increased demand. This
provides a choice of regulatory mix in manag-
ing short-run liquidity, both in the aggregate
and at individual banks. Reserve requirements
can be used to ensure a pool of cash in advance
of day-to-day potential needs. Reserve averag-
ing and carryover at individual banks can then
allow this pool to be redistributed among banks
through transactions in the federal funds market
and other markets for instruments with same-
day payment. Alternatively, the central bank
can simply add and absorb cash on a daily basis
in response to actual needs. Defensive open
market operations and discount window lend-
ing can tailor the size and the distribution of the
pool to the liquidity needs of the day.
Today, therefore, a liquidity rationale for
reserve requirements would need a supporting
demonstration of some public benefit connected
with retaining a market cash-in-advance facility
as an alternative or a supplement to government
credit-on-demand in the liquidity mechanism.
• 28 A recent review of historical episodes of liquidity strains can be
found in Smith (1991).These public benefits might lie in damping vol-
atility of the federal funds rate and in monitor-
ing credit quality.
As monetary policy and Reserve Bank opera-
tions are now structured, reserve requirements
have the effect of maintaining a reasonably
steady rate signal that is the basic source of
short-run information about policy. In the ab-
sence of reserve requirements, the federal funds
rate would be more volatile from day to day
than it is now, all else equal.~
y The nub of the
problem is simply that, without the opportunity
for arbitrage created by reserve averaging as-
sociated with reserve requirements, every bank
would want a zero balance overnight (as long
as the overnight funds rate were positive) be-
cause Fed deposits do not earn interest. Devia-
tions of the daily aggregate supply of Fed
deposits from zero, whether from forecasting er-
rors in carrying out defensive open market
operations or from deliberate policy adjust-
ments, would cause the rate to spike or to
plunge (to the extent that banks were reluctant
to use the discount window), because no inter-
day arbitrage would be possible. With greater
rate volatility, market participants might have
difficulty discerning the funds-rate level in-
tended by policymakers. A more volatile rate
may be undesirable if it befogs market percep-
tions of monetary policy intentions.
Of course, reserve requirements are not the
only mechanism for damping funds-rate volatil-
ity, and the funds rate is not the only vehicle for
conveying monetary policy information. None-
theless, it is worth considering whether, or what
sort of, a rate-smoothing mechanism might
develop in the absence of reserve requirements.
• Banks would be unlikely to hold excess
reserves in place of today's required reserves.
They would need to foresee profits from fi-
nancing the inventor}' of non-interest-bearing
deposits upon which they would draw for
occassional lending when the rate spiked. This
would be possible only if the average of ex-
pected future overnight funds rates were higher
than the permanent cost of financing the inven-
tory. That is, the likelihood of aggregate reserve
shortfalls in defensive open market operations
and policy adjustments would have to exceed
the likelihood of aggregate reserve surpluses.
There seems to be no reason to expect such
asymmetry.-
• For several reasons, clearing balances
are an uncertain basis for market arbitrage to
smooth the funds rate, even though they pay
• 29 Volatility during the course ol a day might also be greater,
depending on rules for daylight overdrafts.
a market rate of interest as currently admin-
istered (see section I and footnote 5). First,
because clearing balances are optional, they
may be insufficient to support the amount of
arbitrage required to smooth the funds rate.
Banks now choose this method to pay for
only about 20 percent of the S900 million of
Reserve Banks" priced services (by holding
balances of less than S4 billion). Second, even
if antitrust considerations did not preclude
making clearing balances the mandatory
mode of payment, the volume of balances
might be insufficient, being a function of reg-
ulatory and competitive forces determining
the demand for Reserve Bank services, as well
as of the level of interest rates. For example,
the entire S870 million of priced services in
1990 would have required balances of S15 bil-
lion if the earnings rate were at the mid-1991
5.75 percent level, but only S10.
7 billion at
the 8.1 percent average funds rate in 1990.
Finally, as this example suggests, and as Sar-
gent and Wallace (1985) have pointed out,
paying a market rate of interest on reserves
may introduce an indeterminacy into the
economy that renders moot the whole con-
cern for the funds rate as a policy signal. If
the only reason to hold clearing balances is
to pay for a fixed value of priced services,
then there could be no excess supply or
demand for balances because the funds rate
would vary inversely with balances to main-
tain the fixed-dollar value of their yield.
• The discount window is the most likely
source of rate smoothing in the absence of in-
terday arbitrage. Aggregate under- and over-
supplies of Fed deposits would put pressure
on the funds rate, but the degree to which
that pressure actually pushed the funds rate
up and down would depend on how readily
banks approached the window and on how
readily Reserve Banks would lend.
• If a clear indication of the policy rate
were desirable for policy information pur-
poses, more direct methods could be used.
FOMC policy decisions could be announced
immediately, rather than after the next regu-
larly scheduled meeting. A more radical
change would be to have the Desk make
both reserve balances and securities avail-
able continuously throughout each day, en-
gaging in repurchase and matched-sale
agreements in Treasury securities on demand
at announced prices set by the FOMC.
A smoothed policy rate is not a necessity.
However, the potential for funds-rate volatility
is simply a symptom of deviations between
• 30 In Canada, banks are said to hold excess reserves as protection
against unexpected net debits, but the Canadian discount rate is market re
1
lated. with penalties for repeated borrowing (Freedman and Dingle [19861).actual supply and zero demand for holding Fed
deposits in the absence of the liquidity pro-
vided by reserve requirements. Another matter
to be considered is that relying exclusively on
the central bank to provide day-to-day liquidity
would eliminate the role of the funds market in
monitoring the credit quality of banks.
A more volatile funds rate would reflect the
absence of market supply and demand for over-
night holdings of Reserve Bank deposits. When
open market operations were completed for a
day, the discount window would be the only
liquidity mechanism available for adjusting the
aggregate supply of Fed deposits. Borrowing at
the window would be the sole way for banks
that were left short to avoid overdrafts caused
by inevitable forecasting errors in the carrying
out of defensive open market operations, be-
cause no pool of reserve deposits would be
available to lend; repaying discount window
loans would be the only way to avoid the
wasted earnings opportunity of holding a non-
interest-bearing overnight deposit. Under these
circumstances, banks might come to view ac-
cess to the window as a right, not a privilege,
and to borrow or repay whenever a high or low
funds rate suggested that the Desk's injection or
withdrawal of Fed deposits had failed to accom-
modate settlement of the day's payments.
Widespread and continuous reliance on the
discount window has a by-product: It supplants
market judgments about creditworthiness with
regulatory judgments. If the deposit insurance
system does not guarantee repayment for all of
a bank's creditors, a benefit of a liquidity mecha-
nism that relies on a market-financed advance
pool of cash is the credit scrutiny of overnight
borrowers by overnight lenders. Of course, mon-
itoring would continue in markets for other
forms of bank liabilities even if banks were to be-
come more heavily dependent on the discount
window for overnight financing. Nonetheless,
the diminished importance of the overnight mar-
ket for unsecured borrowing, coupled with
heightened assurance of official lending, should
increase the influence of regulatory opinion and
reduce the influence of market evaluations in
the short-run management of banks. Moreover,
Reserve Banks should then be expected to assert
their regulatory judgment as providers of sub-
stantial amounts of unsecured daylight overdraft
credit, because reserve deposits would no longer
provide a buffer between them and general
creditor status in the event of a bank failure.
In brief, reserve requirements have a short-
run liquidity rationale because banks have no
other incentive to hold Fed deposits that do not
bear interest. Lacking this artificial demand for
cash, both accidental and policy-intended devia-
tions of the stock of Fed deposits from zero
each day might impart undesirable volatility to
the funds rate. In any case, the burden of meet-
ing the banking system's liquidity needs would
fall heavily on credit decisions made at the dis-
count window, reducing the role of market judg-
ments about credit risk.
V. Conclusion
Rationalizing reserve requirements is not easy.
They have the aura of a tax, but revenue does
not seem to be their purpose. Avoidance erodes
the tax base, and regulatory efforts to avoid
avoidance have had the effect of reducing the
tax rate over time, so that reserve requirements
now yield less than half of 1 percent of Treasury
revenue. The requirements act as a license fee,
entitling some depository institutions to issue
reservable transactions accounts and to main-
tain an account at, buy the services of, and bor-
row from the Federal Reserve Banks. The
question at issue is whether there is a compel-
ling rationale for maintaining the burden of a
license fee in the form of reserve requirements.
Monetary policy implementation has been the
statutory rationale for reserve requirements since
1980, but policy implementation would be little
affected by their elimination. With the interest-
rate targeting approach that has been typical of
Federal Reserve policy implementation, the ab-
sence of reserve requirements could make the
federal funds rate more volatile in the very short
run. perhaps reducing its value as an indicator of
policy intentions. However, changes in policy
techniques could offset this problem. If the alter-
native reserve targeting approach to policy im-
plementation were ever adopted, absence of
reserve requirements could make reserve targets
less predictable, but only in the very short run.
Reserve requirements can have a liquidity
rationale, contrary to traditional assertions that
have overlooked reserve averaging provisions
as the basis for interday arbitrage in the market
for Reserve Bank deposits. A liquidity rationale,
however, is only as strong as the preference for
having private markets rather than the Federal
Reserve manage the supply and distribution of
outside money each day. This preference may
be reinforced by a desire for greater reliance on
the federal funds rate than on the discount rate
as the dominant policy instrument, and for
greater reliance on FOMC guidance of the fed-
eral funds rate than on Board of Governors'control of the discount rate in managing mone-
tary policy in the short run.
Experience with reserve requirements sug-
gests that their rationale is ultimately irrelevant,
because they are an unsustainable regulatory
intrusion in competitive markets. Repeated mar-
ket innovations aimed at avoidance, and regula-
tory relaxation to avoid avoidance, have allowed
required reserves to grow at only one-third the
rate of growth of the banking system since 1952.
Moreover, reserve deposits have been declining
as a share of required reserves, with an increas-
ing number of banks satisfying the requirement
tlirough voluntary holdings of vault cash. If the
trend of the past 30 years continues, reserve
deposits will amount to only 10 percent of re-
quired reserves within the next 30 years.
Preserving an effective system of reserve
requirements will be difficult if built-in incen-
tives for avoidance and voluntary holdings of
vault cash continue to reduce both their burden
and their effects. But if reserve requirements
have no compelling rationale, why not elimi-
nate them?
Appendix
Estimates plotted in figure 1 are based on the
assumption that required reserves finance a por-
tion of Reserve Banks' earning assets. Required
reserves must be apportioned between an amount
that would be held anyway and an amount held
solely because of the requirement. Earning assets
include Treasury and agency securities, loans to
depository institutions, assets denominated in for-
eign currencies, and other loans. This assumes that
all nonearning assets (for example, gold certifi-
cates. Special Drawing Rights, and buildings) are
financed by all other liabilities and capital (for
example, clearing balances, other deposits, excess
reserves, surplus vault cash, currency, capital
stock, and surplus).
Because all vault cash applied to required
reserves is excluded, the estimates plotted here
may be understated after 1959, when vault cash
became eligible to satisfy reserve requirements.
Using reserve deposits alone ignores the possi-
bility that some banks are induced to hold addi-
tional vault cash when the opportunity cost of
these funds is simply the cost of holding a
smaller deposit balance at the Fed. An estimate
based on required reserves including applied
vault cash would nearly double the tax attributed
to reserve requirements, but would be over-
stated: The erroneous implicit assumption would
be that banks would hold no vault cash at all
were it not for reserve requirements. An inter-
mediate method suggests that the understated
estimates involve less error than choosing to
overstate. If banks had maintained the same
proportion of vault cash to reserve deposits
after 1959 as they did in that year, the estimated
tax attributable to reserve requirements would
have been 16.5 percent higher in 1989. and the
contribution of required reserves to Treasury
revenue would have been 0.05 percentage
point higher.
The intentional understatement is offset by
some independent overstatements. One arises
from ignoring the possibility that holdings of
clearing balances would be larger in the absence
of reserve requirements (see section IV). Reserve
Banks' fee income would then be smaller, offset
by larger interest income, if banks did not change
the quantity of services used. However, the
quantity would be unchanged only if the interest
income that banks forgo when holding a clearing
balance were no higher (per unit of service used)
than fees plus the value of the service a clearing
balance provides in avoiding overdrafts and
wasted reserves. This value would be created
for some banks by the elimination of reserve
requirements, so that clearing balances would
be expected to increase.
Another overstatement arises because
data limitations make it convenient to exclude
from earning assets both foreign-currency-
denominated assets (for example, those
acquired through dollar-support intervention in
the foreign exchange market) and other loans
(for instance, those made to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation when it assumes
a failed bank's debt to the discount window).
The estimates presented here differ from re-
lated estimates by Barro (1982) and Goodfriend
and Hargraves (1983) in that they include only
the Treasury revenue attributable to required
reserve deposits; the two earlier estimates deal
with Treasury' revenue attributable to all outside
money issued by the Federal Reserve.
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